அமெரிக்காவின் இரண்டாவது பாலைவன யுத்தம் இரு நோக்கங்களை உள்ளடக்கியது.
1. ஈராக்கை வீழ்த்தி, சதாம் உசேனை நீக்குவது
2. அமைதியை நிலை நாட்டி ஜனநாயக அரசினை ஏற்படுத்துவது
முதல் குறிக்கோளை எட்டுவதற்கு அமெரிக்கா அதிகம் சிரமப்படவில்லை. ஏனெனில் அதன் Strategy பக்காவாக இருந்தது.
1. Intelligence : நாம் நினைத்துப் பார்க்க முடியாத அளவிற்கு போருக்கு முன்னரே தேவைக்கும் அதிகமாக 'புலனாய்வுகள்' மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்டு, 'போரின் வெற்றி'க்குப் போதுமான தகவல்கள் திரட்டப்பட்டு விட்டன.
2. Command Control Network : அமெரிக்காவின் முப்படைகள், அரசு இயந்திரங்கள், புலனாய்வு ஸ்தாபனங்கள், சிவிலியன் நிறுவனங்கள், பிற நாட்டின் படைகள் அனைத்தையும் சிறப்பாக ஒருங்கிணைத்து மேற்சொன்ன நெட்வொர்க் அமைக்கப்பட்டது. ஆணைகளை இடுவது யார்? செயல்படுத்துவது யார்? என்று துல்லியமாகக் கொள்கைகள் வகுக்கப்பட்டு செயல்முறைப் படுத்தப்பட்டது. ஆக மொத்தத்தில் "குழப்பம்" என்ற பேச்சிற்கே இடமில்லை.
3. Execution to Perfection : வெறும் செயல் திட்டங்கள் மட்டுமே வெற்றி தரப்போவதில்லை. 10-30-30 என்பது பெண்டகனின் போர்முறைத் திட்டமென்பார்கள். முதல் பத்து நாட்களில் சண்டையைத் தீவிரமாகத் தொடங்குவது. அடுத்த 30 நாட்களில் குறைந்தபட்ச (போரின்) குறிக்கோள்களை அடைவது. அடுத்த 30 நாட்களில் உலகின் வேறொரு பகுதிக்கு செல்ல மிலிட்டரியைத் தயார்படுத்துவதென்பதே பாதுகாப்பு செகரட்டரியான டொனால்டு ரம்ஸ்பெல்டு நம்பும் தாரக மந்திரம் (இதைத்தான் ஆங்கிலத்தில் "lighter, more lethal and highly mobile fighting force" என்று குறிப்பிட்டார் ரம்ஸ்பெல்டு). ஆக முதல் நாற்பது நாட்களில் அமெரிக்க இராணுவம் சிறப்பாகச் செயல்பட்டு தனது குறிக்கோள்களை எட்டியது. ஆனால் ஈராக் வீழ்ந்த பின்னால் என்ன நடந்ததென்பதைப் பிறகு பார்க்கலாம்.
மொத்தம் 1,45,000 துருப்புகள் ஈராக்கில் பணியில் ஈடுபடுத்தப்பட்டுள்ளன.
இப்போது இந்திய அமைதிப்படைக்கு வருவோம். ஏதோ இலங்கையை அடக்கி கைக்குள் போட்டுக் கொள்ளும் சதியுடன் IPKF இலங்கைக்குச் சென்றது என்று பல அறிவுஜீவிகள் நினைக்கின்றார்களே... அப்படியென்றால் எத்தகைய ஆயத்தங்களுடன்,ஆயுதங்களுடனும் IPKF இருந்தது?
1. மேஜர் ஜெனரல் ஹர்கிரத் சிங் (Major General. Harkirat Singh) IPKF'ன் முதல் கமாண்டர் ஆவார். ஜூன் 1987'ல் டெல்லி ஆப்ஸ் ரூமில் "briefing" பெற்ற பிறகு செகந்திராபாத் வருகின்றார். அங்கே அவரது பிரிகேட் கமாண்டர்கள் அனைவரும் ஆஜர். தனது ADC ஆபீஸரை மட்டுமே எதிர்பார்த்து வந்த ஜெனரலுக்கு ஒரே ஆச்சரியம். என்ன விஷயமென்று வினவியவுடன் தெரியவந்தது, "54'வது டிவிஷன் இன்னும் 8 மணி நேரத்தில் இலங்கைக்குச் செல்லவேண்டும்; இந்தியப் பிரதமரும், இலங்கை அதிபரும் சமாதான உடன்படிக்கை ஒன்றில் கையெழுத்திட்டு விட்டார்கள்;" என்று. உடன்படிக்கையில் என்ன இருந்தது என்று சில மணி நேரங்கள் கழித்தே ஜெனரல் சிங்கிற்கு டெலக்ஸ் வருகின்றது. இதில் அமைதிப்படை என்ன செய்ய வேண்டுமென்று தெளிவான வழிகாட்டுதலோ, ஆணைகளோ கிடையாது. "மொட்டைத் தாத்தா குட்டையில் விழுந்தார்" என்ற ரீதியில் இருந்ததாய் ஜெனரல் சிங்கே குற்றம் சாட்டுகின்றார்.
ஒரு யுத்தம் செய்வதற்காக IPKF சென்றதாகவே வைத்துக் கொள்வோம். அப்படியென்றால் அவர்களுக்கு தெளிவான ஆணைகள் பிறப்பிக்கபட்டு இருக்கும். Intelligence Briefs கொடுக்கப்பட்டு, சகலவிதமான 'Situations & Options' விவாதிக்கப்பட்டு இருக்கும். ஆனால் ஜெனரல் சிங் கூறுகிறார்' 'அவருக்கு புதிப்பிக்கப்பட்ட இலங்கையின் வரைபடம் (மேப்) கூட கொடுக்கப்படவில்லை' என்று. அவரது கூற்றுப்படி செகந்திராபாத்தில் சுற்றுலாப் பயணிகள் பயன்படுத்தும் மேப்புகளை எடுத்துச் சென்று இலங்கைப் படையின் ஜெராக்ஸ் மெஷினில் பிரதிகள் எடுத்து பிரிக்கேட் கமாண்டர்களுக்குக் கொடுத்தாய் தெரியவருகின்றது. அதுசரி சுற்றுலாப் பயணத்திற்குச் சென்று பெண்களை பாலியல் பலாத்காரம் செய்வதே பிரதானமாய்ச் சென்றார்கள் ஒரு "Intelligent Twist" கொடுத்தால் போயிற்று.
லெப்டினெண்ட் ஜெனரல் A.S. கல்கத் பின்னர் ஜெனரல் சிங்கிடமிருந்து பொறுப்பை எடுத்துக் கொண்டார். அவரிடம் ரீ-டிப் பேட்டி கண்டபோது கூறியதாவது:
கேள்வி: நீங்கள் ஏன் வான் வெளித் தாக்குதலை புலிகளின் மீது முழுமையாகப் பயன்படுத்தவில்லை?
ஜெனரல் கல்கத்: வான்வழித் தாக்குதலில் அதிகமான சிவிலியன்கள் இறக்க நேரிடும். நாங்கள் அவர்களுக்கு புனர்வாழ்வு ஏற்படுத்திக் கொடுக்கவே பிரதானமாகச் சென்றோம். வான்வழித் தாக்குதல் தொடுத்திருந்தால் மாறான விளைவுகள் ஏற்பட்டிருக்கும். பலர் வீடிழந்திருப்பார்கள். ... ஏன் ஆர்டிலரி கூட சிவிலியன்கள் இல்லாத காட்டுப்பகுதிகளில் மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தினோம்.
மேலும் அவர் இந்திய ஜவான்களிடமிருந்து புராதன SLR எனப்படும் "Self Loading Rifle" எனப்படுவது. புலிகளுக்கு எதிரான "Counter-Insurgency" என்னும் ஆபரேஷனுக்கு முற்றிலும் உதவாக்கரையான, பளு நிறைந்த, ரவைகளை மெதுவாகத் துப்புகின்றவை SLR. புலிகளிடமோ AK-47 ரக நவீனத் துப்பாக்கிகள். காடுகளை இஞ்ச் பை இஞ்சாக அறிந்தவர்கள் புலிகள். நம்மவரிடம் குறைந்தபட்ச வரைபடங்கள் கூடக் கிடையாது. சரி இரவில் பார்க்க உதவும் Night-Vision" உபகரணங்கள் உண்டா? கிடையாது. குண்டு துளைக்கா கவச உடை, கவச வண்டிகள், நவீன ரேடியோ செட்டுகள், நவீன டாங்க்குகள், விமானங்கள், போர்க்கப்பல்கள்... கிடையாது.
பிறகு உலகத்திலேயே நான்காவது பெரிய இராணுவம் எதற்குத் தான் இலங்கைக்குச் சென்றது? போரிடத்தானே. அப்படியென்றால் சினிமாக்களில் வருவது போல பறந்து பறந்து அடித்து இலங்கையைக் கைப்பற்றி விடலாமென்ற கனவுடன் சென்றார்களா?
இன்று அமெரிக்கா போரின் போது பயன்படுத்திய அத்தனை தளவாடங்களையும் அமைதியை ஏற்படுத்தப் பயன்படுத்துகின்றது. இருப்பினும் அமைதி வந்தபாடில்லை. அதற்காக காரண காரியங்களையும் பின்னர் பார்க்கலாம்.
மேலும் விரியும்....
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Indo Sri-Lanka Peace Agreement
Text I am saving here for future reference (Thx: TamilNation.Org)
Text of Agreement
The President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayawardene, and the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, having met at Colombo on July 29, 1987.
Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying and strengthening the traditional friendship of Sri Lanka and India, and acknowledging the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka, and the consequent violence, and for the safety, well being, and prosperity of people belonging to all communities in Sri Lanka.
Have this day entered into the following agreement to fulfill this objective.
IN THIS CONTEXT,
1.1 Desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka:
1.2 Acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a "multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural society" consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers:
1.3 Recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured:
1.4 Also recognising that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups:
1.5 Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi ethnic, multi lingual and multi religious plural society in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfil their aspirations:
2. Resolve that
2.1 Since the government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining provinces to join to form one administrative unit and also by a referendum to separate as may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern Provinces as outlined below:
2.2 During the period, which shall be considered an interim period (i.e. from the date of the elections to the Provincial Council, as specified in para 2.B to the date of the referendum as specified in para 2.3) the Northern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one administrative unit, having one elected Provincial Council. Such a unit will have one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers.
2.3 There will be a referendum on or before 31st of December 1988 to enable the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether:
A) The Eastern Province should remain linked with the Northern Province as one administrative unit, and continue to be governed together with the Northern Province as specified in para 2.2 or:
B) The Eastern Province should constitute a separate administrative unit having its own distinct Provincial Council with a separate Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers
The President may, at his discretion, decide to postpone such a referendum.
2.4 All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence or other reasons, will have the right to vote in such a referendum. Necessary conditions to enable them to return to areas from where they were displaced will be created.
2.5 The referendum when held will be monitored by a committee headed by the Chief Justice, a member appointed by the President, nominated by the Government of Sri Lanka, and a member appointed by the President, nominated by the representatives of the Tamil speaking people of the Eastern Province.
2.6 A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the referendum.
2.7 Meetings and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the laws of the country, will be allowed before the referendum.
2.8 Elections to Provincial Councils will be held within the next three months, in any event before the 31st December 1987. Indian observers will be invited for elections to the Provincial Council in the North and East.
2.9 The Emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern Provinces by August 15, 1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the Island within 48 hours of the signing of this Agreement. All arms presently held by Militant Groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the government of Sri Lanka.
Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by Militant Groups, the Army and other security personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on 25th May 1987. The process of surrendering of arms and the confining of security personnel and moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.
2.10 The government of Sri Lanka will utilise for the purpose of law enforcement and maintenance of security in the Northern and Eastern Provinces the same organisations and mechanisms of government as are used in the rest of the country.
2.11 The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency Laws, and to Combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under these Laws. The government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bringing them back into the mainstream of national life. India will co-operate in the process.
2.12 The government of Sri Lanka will accept and abide by the above provisions and expect all others to do likewise.
2.13 If the framework for the resolutions is accepted, the government of Sri Lanka will implement the relevant proposals forthwith.
2.14 The government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and co- operate in the implementation of these proposals.
2.15 These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of the proposals negotiated from 4.5.1986 to 19.12.86. Residual matters not finalised during the above negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this Agreement. These proposals are also conditional to the government of India co-operating directly with the government of Sri Lanka in their implementation.
2.16 These proposals are also conditional to the government of India taking the following actions if any Militant Groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this frameworK of proposals for a settlement, namely,
A) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka.
B) The Indian Navy/Coastguard will co-operate with the Sri Lanka Navy in preventing Tamil Militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka.
C) In the event that the government of Sri Lanka requests the government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals the government of India will co-operate by giving to the government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when requested.
D) The government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are resident here, concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.
E) The government of Sri Lanka and India will co-operate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
2.17 The government of Sri Lanka shall ensure free, full and fair participation of voters from all communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in electoral processes envisaged in this Agreement. The government of India will extend full co-operation to the government of Sri Lanka in this regard.
2.18 The official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Tamil and English will also be official languages.
3. This Agreement and the Annexures thereto shall come into force upon signature
In witness whereof we have set our hands and seals hereunto.
Done in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on this the twenty ninth day of July of the year one thousand nine hundred and eighty seven, in duplicate, both texts being equally authentic.
Junius Richard Jayawardene, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India
Annexure to the Indo - Sri Lanka Agreement
1. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that the referendum mentioned in paragraph 2 and its sub-paragraphs of the Agreement will be observed by a representative of the Election Commission of India to be invited by His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka.
2. Similarly, both Heads of Government agree that the elections to the Provincial Council mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the Agreement will be observed and all para military personnel will be withdrawn from the Eastern and Northern Provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to fair elections to the Council.
3. The President, in his discretion, shall absorb such para military forces, which came into being due to the ethnic violence, into the regular security forces of Sri Lanka.
4. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that the Tamil Militants shall surrender their arms to authorities agreed upon to be designated by the President of Sri Lanka. The surrender shall take place in the presence of one senior representative each of the Sri Lanka Red Cross and the India Red Cross.
5. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that a Joint Indo Sri Lankan Observer Group consisting of qualified representatives of the government of Sri Lanka and the government of India would monitor the cessation of hostilities from 31 July 1987.
6. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India also agree that in terms of paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16 (C) of the Agreement, an Indian Peace Keeping Contingent may be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so required.
Dear Vanthiathevan
Thanks for presenting the real and detailed picture of that most infamous IPKF fiasco. I will place my views on your series and also on the various India bashing elements once you complete your series. Very informative, Please keep going.
Rehards
Jai Hind
Sa.Thirumalai
http://1seythi.wordpress.com/2006/08/02/did-india-help-sri-lankan-tamils-until-1987/
Authors:
Yashoda Reddy (Andhra Pradesh)
Siva Reddy (Andhra Pradesh)
Thanjai Nalankilli (Tamil Nadu)
Outline
1. Introduction
2. India’s Cunning Strategy of Bleeding Sri Lanka
3. Air Drop over Jaffna
4. India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987 and Tamil Grievances
5. What did India get from the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987?
6. India did not help the Sri Lankan Tamils
7. India could Have Achieved Everything by Supporting Tamil Eelam
1. Introduction
It is generally believed inside and outside of India, and indeed spread by the Indian Government, that India helped Sri Lankan Tamil freedom fighters until 1987, and that India turned against the LTTE only after it refused to disarm and accept the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord signed by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J.R. Jeyawardene in July 1987. We will show the falsity of this claim. India was not really helping the Sri Lankan Tamils but it was engaged in a very dubious, selfish, cunning and destructive strategy of bleeding Sri Lanka until the Sri Lankan Government acceded to certain demands India had to achieve its military and foreign policy objectives in South Asia.
2. India’s Cunning Strategy of Bleeding Sri Lanka
The Indian Government and much of the Indian press repeatedly claim that India actively supported the Tamil struggle against Sinhala oppression until 1987. They point to the military training and weapons India gave to the various freedom fighters, such as the EPRLF, EROS, LTTE, PLOTE and TELO, between 1983 and 1987.
Yes, India did aid the Tamil freedom fighters. Yes, they did train them including training in bomb making. Yes, they did supply them with weapons. The question is, “How much of an aid and to what purpose?” India aided the Tamil freedom fighters, not to help the Tamil struggle against Sinhala oppression but to destabilize Sri Lanka enough to convince the Sri Lankan Government that unless it gives in to certain Indian demands with respect to India’s military and foreign policy objectives, India could see to it that the Sinhala-Tamil war continues and possibly Sri Lanka breaks up into two countries–a Sinhala nation and a Tamil nation. We should look at this in view of Sri Lanka’s anti-Indian activities in the foreign policy front in the preceding years.
During the cold war years (which were still cold in the 1980s), India leaned towards the then Soviet Union and Sri Lanka towards the United States of America (USA). India was irked by its tiny southern neighbor thumping its nose at the big brother India but could do very little to make Sri Lanka accept its dictate. During the India-Pakistan war in 1971, Pakistani Air Force planes have to fly around India to the south to move arms and supplies from West Pakistan to East Pakistan. Without Sri Lanka’s permission for these planes to refuel in Sri Lanka, Pakistan’s ability to wage war against India would have been severely hampered. Sri Lanka did allow Pakistan to refuel in Sri Lanka - a very hostile action against India during that war. Although Indian officials were fuming at Sri Lanka, India could do very little about it. Any direct military action against Sri Lanka would have brought world condemnation and possible American military intervention on the side of Sri Lanka. India has to find some other way, short of military intervention, to force Sri Lanka to accept its dictate in foreign policy and military matters.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, India was also upset over the close relationship developing between Sri Lanka and the USA. The possibility of Sri Lanka offering facilities for the American Navy at its Trincomalee port (the largest natural harbor in the world) and the expansion of the Voice of America Station in Sri Lanka (with the possibility of America setting up electronic listening posts at the Voice of America facility) was looked at with deep concern by India. Again, there was nothing India could do.
Like a ripe fruit falling on one’s lap, opportunity knocked in the form of the rise of Tamil freedom fighters in Sri Lanka in the late 1970s and early 1980s. India decided to arm and train the Tamil freedom fighters just enough to seriously threaten the Sri Lankan Army in the north and east of the island (the traditional Tamil home land that Tamils call “Tamil Eelam”). India never aided the freedom fighters enough to defeat the Sri Lankan army but just enough to bleed the army. The level of support was carefully planned to meet this strategy. By Indian calculations, if the Sri Lankan Government agrees to accede to India’s demands on the military and foreign policy fronts, India can stop the aid to freedom fighters. The freedom fighter, not strong enough to dislodge the Sri Lankan army from their homeland (northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka), will not be able to do much. (Things went wrong for India because LTTE did not depend solely on Indian arms and training. It had its own independent arms procurement operations and training without the knowledge of Indian intelligence agencies.)
3. Air Drop over Jaffna
At this point we would like to point out a sub-drama India staged in the mid- 1980s. At that time much of Jaffna peninsula was under Tamil control (LTTE control). Sri Lankan Government had cut off much of the food supply to Jaffna as it is doing today to LTTE-controlled Vanni region. Saying that it would feed the people of Jaffna, India sent a plane with some food packets and dropped them into Jaffna. The reason for this display of air might was not to feed the starving people of Jaffna (the food packets would not even feed a few dozen people for a day while the Jaffna population was in the hundreds of thousands) but to send a forceful message to Sri Lanka that India could violate Sri Lankan air space with impunity and send Air Force planes, and by implication, that India would not hesitate to violate Sri Lankan sovereignty and send Indian troops into Sri Lanka if Sri Lanka did not accede to its demands. Sri Lanka did get the message and soon signed the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord in 1987.
India’s intention was not the feeding of the Jaffna Tamils but sending a forceful message to the Sri Lankan Government is all too evident by the fact that a single plane dropped food just enough to feed a few dozen people for a day. If it really wanted to help the Tamil people it would have sent a ship loaded with food or a dozen large Air Force transport planes loaded with food (as America did when it sent food to West Berlin when it was blockaded by the Soviet Union back in the 1960s). There was no risk to Indian ships or planes; Sri Lanka had a tiny navy and air force back in 1987 that could not cause any damage to Indian ships and planes.
India does know how to send food to blockaded people. Remember April-May 2001. Sri Lankan troops were virtually encircled by the LTTE in Jaffna and the possibility of the troops starving arose. Sri Lanka did not have the navy or air force sufficient to supply them with food. What did India do? It kept a dozen or so large air force transport planes loaded with food and medicine on the ready at the Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum) Airport, the closest airport to Jaffna, ready to take off if the Sri Lankan troops were fully encircled. These planes would be doing repeat trips, should the need arise. Compare it with a single pane loaded with a few packets of food sent to Jaffna in the 1980s (although the number of starving people were much more than the Sri Lankan troops cornered in Jaffna). India was not feeding the Jaffna Tamils; it was sending a message to the Sri Lankan Government!
So any talk that India helped the Tamil freedom fighters until 1987 and that India airdropped food to feed the starving Jaffna Tamils was nonsense. These were part of Indian attempt to force Sri Lanka to agree to meet its foreign policy and military demands. If any one has any doubt about it, all they have to do is see what India did when Sri Lanka finally said “yes” to India’s selfish demands. The result was the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord. Read the accord and, especially, the accompanying letter from the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to the Sri Lankan President Jeyawardene. You will see India had no interest in helping the Sri Lankan Tamil minority but only interested in having Sri Lanka accede to its selfish demands that have nothing to do with the Tamil minority. We will explain it in the next section.
4. India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987 and Tamil Grievances
How does the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord address minority Tamil grievances of discrimination in jobs and education, police powers and government-sponsored Sinhalese colonization of the Tamil areas in the north and east? Nothing. All that the accord said was that there would be provincial council(s) for the north and east with unspecified powers? The powers to be devolved to the provincial council is to be negotiated between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil minority AFTER the Tamil freedom fighters lay down their arms. Considering the very basic fact that the only reason that the Sri Lankan Government was even considering provincial councils was because of the armed strength of the freedom fighters, once they lay down their arms what kind of powers will the Sri Lankan Government devolve to the provincial councils? Will the provincial council have power over the further Sinhalese colonization of the Tamil areas in the north and east? How much of law and order will be devolved to the provincial councils? What taxes will the provincial councils be allowed to collect to fund its projects? These critical points were left open in the accord. A devolution agreement without the specification of what powers will be devolved is not worth the paper it is written on. These critical points were not only left open in the accord but the accord specifically states that they will be decided only AFTER the Tamil freedom fighters lay down their arms. So, with the freedom fighters disarmed, what powers will be devolved to the provincial council would depend on the “goodwill” of the Sri Lankan Government. What kind of a “goodwill” can the Tamil minority expect from a government that unleashed police brutality on peaceful demonstrations against discrimination and allowed Sinhalese mob violence of murder, rape and arson against the Tamil minority to “teach” them a lesson?
While matters of critical importance to the Tamil minority were left to be resolved later, issues of importance to both Sri Lanka and India were clearly spelled out in the accord and were to take effect immediately (within weeks). What did the Sri Lankan Government want? It wanted the Tamil freedom fighters disarmed. What its military could not do in the battlefields, it got through the accord. The accord says that the freedom fighters should lay down their arms immediately and, if not, the Indian army (the fourth largest army in the world at that time) would forcibly disarm them.
What did India get? We discuss it in the next section.
5. What did India get from the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987?
India and Sri Lanka tried to keep an exchange of letters annexed to the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord a secret but it was exposed by an Indian newspaper. Those letters spell out what India will get from Sri Lanka in exchange for stopping all aid to the freedom fighters and disarming them (either voluntarily by the fighters or forcibly by the Indian army).
Two signed secret letters were exchanged between the Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka on the same day they signed the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord (July 29, 1987). These letters were kept secret not only from the world abut also from the Tamil leaders of Sri Lanka (that itself shows the under-handed nature of Indian Government dealings). Soon an Indian newspaper got hold of these letters and published them. These letters were then published in a number other papers also and are now common knowledge. Here is the relevant extract from one of the secret letters (from the Prime Minister of India to the President of Sri Lanka):
You had, during the course of our discussion, agreed to meet some of India’s concerns as follows:
i) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presence will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lanka relations.
ii) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests.
iii) The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee oil tank will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.
iv) Sri Lanka’s agreement with foreign broadcasting organizations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.
India got everything it wanted from Sri Lanka in exchange for stopping the aid to the Tamil freedom fighters and disarming them (forcibly if necessary). Because of the then on-going cold war between the United States of America and Soviet Union, and India’s close relationship with the latter, India looked at the United States with suspicion. India did not want American military or intelligence personnel stationed at its southern neighbor Sri Lanka (America had military and intelligence presence at its northern neighbor Pakistan); India got Sri Lanka not to station such personnel in its soil per item (i). What has it to do with Tamil grievances? Did the Tamil freedom fighter shed blood for this? India did not want American Navy at Trincomalee harbor so close to its southeastern coast. Item (ii) in the letter stipulates that Sri Lanka would not do that. What has it to do with Tamil grievances? Did the Tamil freedom fighter shed blood for this? India did not want America setting up electronic listening posts at its southern neighbor in the guise of expanding its Voice of America facilities in Sri Lanka. Item (iv) of the letter prevents Sri Lanka from allowing it. What has it to do with Tamil grievances? Did the Tamil freedom fighter shed blood for this? India also did not like the idea of American or European companies operating the Trincomalee oil tank, a potentially lucrative business. Item (iii) of the letter gives that concession to India. What has it to do with Tamil grievances? Did the Tamil freedom fighter shed blood for this?
6. India did not help the Sri Lankan Tamils
The above-discussed letter from the Prime Minister of India to the President of Sri Lanka signed on the same day (July 29, 1987) as the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord is proof and evidence that the reason India armed and trained the Sri Lankan Tamil freedom fighters was to force Sri Lanka to accede to its selfish military and foreign policy demands and not to help the Tamil minority of Sri Lanka achieve the legitimate rights denied to them. We hope that those who vocally repeat that India helped Sri Lankan Tamils until 1987 would keep quiet from now on.
7. India could have Achieved Everything by Supporting Tamil Eelam
In Part I of this series of articles we established through a careful and thorough analysis that an independent Tamil Eelam is in the national interest of India. We will add to it here in the background of the above-discussed letter from the Indian Prime Minister to the Sri Lankan President. As noted in Section 5, India wanted four concessions from Sri Lanka in exchange for stopping the aid to Tamil freedom fighters and disarming them. Could India have achieved the same by supporting an independent Tamil Eelam? Yes, let us elaborate.
(i) India did not want foreign military and intelligence personnel (though not named, India was referring to the United States of America) stationed in its southern neighbor Sri Lanka. An independent Tamil Eelam would be a buffer between India and Sri Lanka. Tamil Eelam, with its lengthy coastline, would have been an excellent buffer.
(ii) India did not want foreign naval presence at Trincomalee, the largest natural harbor in the world. It so happens that Trincomalee is in the Tamil region (Tamil Eelam). Had India been friendly to the Tamil people, instead of bleeding them and betraying them, the independent Tamil Eelam would have gladly accepted this proposition. In fact, in July 1987 in New Delhi, leader of the predominant freedom-fighting group (LTTE) Prabaharan told Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that India could have the exclusive use of Trincomalee harbor if it supported the creation of independent Tamil Eelam.
(iii) India wanted participation in the operation of the Trincomalee oil tank. India would have got this from Tamil Eelam. After all, LTTE leader Prabaharan had promised exclusive use of the Trincomalee port to Indian Navy.
(iv) India did not want electronic listening post at its southern neighbor Sri Lanka in the guise of Voice of America. An independent Tamil Eelam would have been a buffer between India and Sri Lanka.
In spite of the fact that India could have achieved everything it wanted in military and foreign policy matters more reliably by supporting an independent Tamil Eelam, India went through a circuitous and dubious strategy of forcing the Sri Lankan Government to accede to its military and foreign policy demands. (We have discussed in Part I of this article series that the agreement reached with Sri Lanka could not be relied upon and that Sri Lanka would never be a trust-worthy ally to India Once the Tamil freedom fighters are no longer a threat and the Tamil minority is subdued, Sri Lanka would renege on the agreement forced upon it and go back to its earlier hostile posture. We will not repeat it here. Readers are referred to Part I)
Since India’s military and foreign policy interests are best served by an independent Tamil Eelam rather than a united Sri Lanka (as discussed in detail in Part I of this article series) why is the Indian Government pursuing an anti-Tamil Eelam policy? Is there a “dirty secret” behind Indian Government’s irrational policy towards the Sri Lankan Crisis? We will explore it in Part III of this article series.
http://1seythi.wordpress.com/2006/08/02/did-india-help-sri-lankan-tamils-until-1987/
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